

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

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Employment of RRO's

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1. It has always been fundamental to the conception of the employment of the RRO's that they would "lie low" for 30 days after D-Day. This was a basic decision, made with a view toward keeping reserve assets in the event of enemy counter-attack and for the implementation of Plan "C".

2. At the present juncture, this concept has more validity than ever. The situation has become much more fluid than could previously be foreseen. With the tension created inside the country, the possible arming of labor squads, etc. it is even more important that we keep in reserve a series of assets that can provide us with country-wide communications after D-Day.

3. It is therefore proposed that the RRO's not be launched until just prior to D-Day, or perhaps even at D plus 1. Then the RRO's could take up their assigned positions, make contact with the FCP and keep a steady stream of information going for the entire consolidation period.

4. Launching the RRO's now, in the present situation, runs the risk of wasting these well-trained men, both because they may be caught in the turbulence and also because they may not be able to carry out their systematic communications duties in a situation as fast-moving as the present one.

5. In place of the RRO's, concise and clear briefing has been given to all organizers as to a pre-arranged schedule of ~~xxxx~~ aerial supply and resupply. This system involves notification either by pre-arrangement or through SHERWOOD; SHERWOOD is certainly a sure

instrument for notification. Therefore, the need for the RRO's, insofar as direction of aerial supply is concerned, is diminished to the point where it is feasible to reserve them for post D-Day monitoring.